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A NON-STANDARD ANALYSIS OF A CULTURAL
ICON: THE CASE OF PAUL HALMOS
PIOTR B LASZCZYK, ALEXANDRE BOROVIK, VLADIMIR KANOVEI,
MIKHAIL G. KATZ, TARAS KUDRYK, SEMEN S. KUTATELADZE,
AND DAVID SHERRY
Abstract. We examine Paul Halmos’ comments on category the-
ory, Dedekind cuts, devil worship, logic, and Robinson’s infinites-
imals. Halmos’ scepticism about category theory derives from his
philosophical position of naive set-theoretic realism. In the words
of an MAA biography, Halmos thought that mathematics is “cer-
tainty” and “architecture” yet 20th century logic teaches us is that
mathematics is full of uncertainty or more precisely incomplete-
ness. If the term architecture meant to imply that mathematics is
one great solid castle, then modern logic tends to teach us the op-
posite lession, namely that the castle is floating in midair. Halmos’
realism tends to color his judgment of purely scientific aspects of
logic and the way it is practiced and applied. He often expressed
distaste for nonstandard models, and made a sustained effort to
eliminate first-order logic, the logicians’ concept of interpretation,
and the syntactic vs semantic distinction. He felt that these were
vague, and sought to replace them all by his polyadic algebra. Hal-
mos claimed that Robinson’s framework is “unnecessary” but Hen-
son and Keisler argue that Robinson’s framework allows one to dig
deeper into set-theoretic resources than is common in Archimedean
mathematics. This can potentially prove theorems not accessible
by standard methods, undermining Halmos’ criticisms.
Keywords: Archimedean axiom; bridge between discrete and
continuous mathematics; hyperreals; incomparable quantities; in-
dispensability; infinity; mathematical realism; Robinson.
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1. Introduction
Fifty years ago, the Pacific Journal of Mathematics published a pair
of papers in the same issue, each containing a proof of a conjecture in
functional analysis known as the Smith–Halmos conjecture. The event
had philosophical ramifications due to the fact that one of these proofs
involved methods that were not only unusual for functional analysis but
also challenged both historical thinking about the evolution of analysis
and foundational thinking in mathematics. The present article explores
these and related issues.
Paul Halmos was a 20th century expert in functional analysis. His
textbooks on measure theory, Hilbert spaces, and finite dimensional
vector spaces are well written, still relevant, and highly praised.1
Following the Aronszajn–Smith proof of the existence of invariant
subspaces for compact operators [Aronszajn & Smith 1954], Smith and
Halmos conjectured that the same should be true for more general
classes of operators, such as operators with a compact square. A
proof in the more general case of polynomially compact operators in
[Bernstein & Robinson 1966] (exploiting Robinson’s infinitesimals) was
a notable event in functional analysis. Simultaneously the same journal
published an infinitesimal-free proof [Halmos 1966].
In 1991, J. Dauben interviewed the distinguished model theorist
C. C. Chang about the Bernstein–Robinson paper. Even a quarter
century later (and after [Lomonosov 1973] superseded the 1966 results)
Chang still seemed a bit sore about Bernstein and Robinson not getting
enough credit, for he insisted that
1See http://www.maa.org/news/paul-halmos-a-life-in-mathematics
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once you know something is true, it is easier to find other
proofs. Major credit must go to Robinson.2 (Chang
quoted in [Dauben 1995, p. 327])
Robinson himself supports Chang’s reading:
As for the Halmos standard ‘translation’, it was all very
nice, but the NSA (i.e., nonstandard analysis) proof was
quite natural, while the standard proof required an ar-
gument that would not have been so easy to spot with-
out first seeing the NSA version. (Reported by Moshe
Machover, private communication)
In a course at Hebrew University in the late 1960s, Robinson said:
Halmos was proud of his proof but in the end all he did
was rewrite our proof in a language he was educated in.
(Reported by Shmuel Dahari, private communication).
Halmos himself essentially agreed with this sentiment when he wrote
that the purpose of his paper was
to show that by appropriate small modifications [,] the
Bernstein–Robinson proof can be converted . . . into one
that is expressible in the standard framework of classical
analysis. [Halmos 1966, p. 433] (emphasis added)
Further details can be found in Section 2.
Subsequently Halmos expressed reservations about Robinson’s frame-
work, and described researchers working in the framework as converts
(see Section 6.1).
What philosophical outlook shaped Halmos’ attitude toward Robin-
son’s framework, and prompted his critical remarks concerning fellow
experts? Following [Jerome 2004], we provide an analysis that can
hardly be described as standard of a little-known aspect of a mathe-
matical cultural icon.
2. Paraphrase
The invariant subspace conjecture of Smith and Halmos was first
proved by Bernstein and Robinson, and published in the Pacific Jour-
nal of Mathematics (PJM ). A number of scholars would have been more
comfortable had Halmos’ infinitesimal-free paraphrase of the proof in
[Bernstein & Robinson 1966] (for which Halmos was apparently the ref-
eree) appeared in the next issue of the PJM rather than being published
simulataneously in the same issue as [Halmos 1966].
The Bernstein–Robinson proof is presented in detail in [Davis 1977].
2Chang’s reference to Robinson is certainly shorthand for Bernstein–Robinson.
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Halmos claimed two decades later that he received the manuscript by
Bernstein and Robinson “early in 1966” in [Halmos 1985, p. 320], but
that date is certainly incorrect. Dauben documents a letter from Hal-
mos to Robinson acknowledging receipt of the manuscript, and dated
19 june 1964 (see [Dauben 1995, p. 328, note 66]). Thus Halmos was
in possession of the Bernstein–Robinson manuscript even prior to its
submission for publication on 5 july 1964.
Several specialists have privately testified that Halmos was most
likely the referee for the Bernstein–Robinson paper.3 A slightly de-
layed publication of Halmos’ paraphrase (say, in the following issue of
the PJM ) would have avoided the effect of weakening the Bernstein–
Robinson priority claim on the result, and may have constituted a
more appropriate use of publication timetables. There have been sev-
eral cases of scholars affected by the marginalisation campaign against
Robinson’s framework who ended up suffering in terms of employment
as a result, indicating that such issues are not purely academic.
Here by “Robinson’s framework” we mean Robinson’s rigorous jus-
tification of Leibnizian infinitesimal procedures in the framework of
modern mathematics (viz., the Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory with the
axiom of choice), as developed in [Robinson 1961] and [Robinson 1966].
Robinson exploited the theory of types in presenting his framework.
Alternative presentations involve ultraproduct constructions; see e.g.,
[Luxemburg 1962].
3. Indispensability argument of Henson and Keisler
Halmos explicitly referred to his own paper as a “translation” (of
the Bernstein–Robinson proof). However he did not think of it as an
awkward translation, and on the contrary used it to justify his claim
in [Halmos 1985] that NSA is unnecessary because it can always be
translated. The following year, Henson and Keisler published a paper
[Henson & Keisler 1986] that was a reaction to a widespread belief at
the time that Robinson’s framework is unnecessary, and in particular
provided a rebuttal of Halmos’ claims.
3.1. Second-order Arithmetic. Henson and Keisler point out that a
nonstandard extension of second order Arithmetic is not a conservative
extension of second-order Arithmetic, but is rather closely related to
third-order theory. This is because, roughly, nonstandard arguments
often rely on saturation techniques that typically involve third-order
theory. They go on to argue against the type of fallacy contained
3See also a related discussion at http://mathoverflow.net/questions/225455.
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in Halmos’ position that Robinson’s framework is unnecessary. The
gist of their argument is that since most mathematics takes place at
second-order level, there may well be nonstandard proofs whose stan-
dard translations, while theoretically possible, may well be humanly
incomprehensible. They conclude as follows:
This shows that in principle there are theorems which
can be proved with nonstandard analysis but cannot be
proved by the usual standard methods. The problem of
finding a specific and mathematically natural example of
such a theorem remains open. [Henson & Keisler 1986,
p. 377]
In this spirit, [Tao & Vu 2016] use the language of Robinson’s frame-
work in order to avoid a large number of iterative arguments to manage
a large hierarchy of parameters. Ultraproducts form a bridge between
discrete and continuous analysis [Gordon 1997].
3.2. Rebuttal of Halmos’ claims. Halmos formulated a pair of claims
concerning Robinson’s framework, which are closely related but per-
haps not identical:
(1) Robinson had a language and not an idea.
(2) Robinson introduced a special tool, too special, and other tools
can do everything it can, so it’s all a matter of taste.
In Halmos’ own words:
If they had done it in Telegu [sic]4 instead, I would have
found their paper even more difficult to decode, but the
extra difficulty would have been one of degree, not of
kind. [Halmos 1985, p. 204]
Even though Halmos calls it a “language” in (1) and a “tool” in (2),
the underlying claim is essentially the same: just as you can express
your mathematics in English, French, or Telugu and it does not make
any difference, so similarly you can do your mathematics in traditional
set-ups or in a Robinsonian logical contraption.
The rebuttal is the same in both cases, and was already provided
by the Henson–Keisler argument and the example of Tao’s work, as
discussed in Section 3.
Today, Robinson’s framework is neither a language, idea, or tool,
but rather is a branch of modern mathematics with its own domain,
set of tools, collection of key results, and numerous applications.
4The correct spelling is Telugu.
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4. Dedekind cuts and category theory
The following comment by Halmos needs to be addressed:
Here is a somewhat unfair analogy: Dedekind cuts. It’s
unfair because it’s even more narrowly focused, but per-
haps it will suggest what I mean. No, we don’t have to
learn it (Dedekind cuts or non-standard analysis): it’s a
special tool, too special, and other tools can do every-
thing it does. It’s all a matter of taste. [Halmos 1985,
p. 204]
Halmos seems to view both Dedekind cuts and category theory with
disfavor. On the other hand, one who doesn’t favor cuts should ap-
parently favor category theory, since excising cuts would make the real
line a category, i.e., something without a strict set-theoretic definition.
4.1. Category theory viewed by some. Halmos’ attitude to Robin-
son’s framework is somewhat comparable to Halmos’ attitude to cate-
gory theory, at the expense of which he also made disparaging remarks:
A microscopic examination of such similarities might
lead to category theory, a subject that is viewed by some
with the same kind of suspicion as logic, but not to the
same extent. [Halmos 1985, p. 205]
In his essay “Applied mathematics is bad mathematics,” Halmos claimed
that when applied mathematicians describe category theory as “ab-
stract nonsense,” they mean it [Halmos 1981a, p. 15], but provided
no evidence to substantiate his claim that applied mathematicians feel
this way, or that such sentiments are due to anyone but himself.
Halmos sought to identify categories with universal algebras, thus
reducing category theory to set theory in [Halmos 1981b].
Category theory is today one of the fastest growing industries, with
avid advocates like David Kazhdan. Halmos might have pigeon-holed
Kazhdan a “convert” as well (see Section 6.1), but it wouldn’t have
helped Halmos’ reputation.
4.2. Bridge between discrete and continuous. Robinson’s frame-
work is a fruitful modern research area that has attracted many re-
searchers, as noted in Section 3.2. Halmos predicted that
in the foreseeable future . . . discrete mathematics will
be an increasingly useful tool in the attempt to under-
stand the world, and . . . analysis will therefore play a
proportionally smaller role. [Halmos 1981a, p. 19] (em-
phasis added)
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What Halmos may not have anticipated is that, in fact, the ultra-
products form a bridge between discrete and continuous analysis as
mentioned above.
5. Halmos and logic
The algebraic approach to logic has a long history starting with
Boole, continuing with Peirce and Schro¨der, and reaching a high point
with the Lo¨wenheim–Skolem theorem. Subsequently it went out of
fashion to a certain extent, but the work of Tarski on Boolean algebras
with operators eventually led to his cylindric algebras, i.e., Bolean al-
gebras with quantifiers as the added operators. The Tarski school has
proved a number of difficult, and perhaps even deep, results about this
class of algebras.
5.1. From cylindric to polyadic algebras. Halmos became inter-
ested in this topic, as he discusses in his book [Halmos 1985], where
one finds some remarks on polyadic vs cylindric algebras; see also
[Halmos 2000]. Whether or not there are any contributions of sub-
stance by Halmos to logic proper is a delicate question. His polyadic
formalism differs from the cylindric counterpart, but the theory in his
book is a straightforward translation of first order logic, thus not deep
by any means. Neither polyadic nor cylindric algebras made a major
contribution to logic and its applications, and are of marginal interest
today.
In later work on probability, the algebraic formalism was dropped
in favor of working within first order logic. Halmos’ translation of
the completeness theorem, i.e., his representation theorem, is rather
complicated. Thus, Fenstad gave a simplified presentation and used
this work to give a rather general representation theorem for logical
probabilities in [Fenstad 1967].
Halmos’ feelings about logic in general and Robinson’s framework in
particular are neatly summarized in a limerick dating from 1957, and
republished on page 216 in his book:
If you think that your paper is vacuous,
Use the first-order functional calculus.
It then becomes logic,
And, as if by magic,
The obvious is hailed as miraculous.
It has to be admitted that Halmos and Bishop had something in
common, namely literary talent (see Section 6.2). The limerick aptly
summarizes the import of Halmos’ own contribution to logic.
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5.2. Quixotic battle against formal logic. A passage in Halmos’
book reproduced in his article “An Autobiography of Polyadic Alge-
bras” is part of his attack on formal logic (as opposed to symbolic logic
favored by Halmos), and runs as follows:
When I asked a logician what a variable was, I was
told that it was just a ‘letter’ or a ‘symbol’. Those
words do not belong to the vocabulary of mathematics; I
found the explanation that used them unhelpful–vague.
When I asked what ‘interpretation’ meant, I was an-
swered in bewildering detail (set, correspondence, sub-
stitution, satisfied formulas). In comparison with the
truth that I learned later (homomorphism), the answer
seemed to me unhelpful–forced, ad hoc. It was a thrill to
learn the truth–to begin to see that formal logic might
be just a flat photograph of some solid mathematics–
it was a thrill and a challenge. [Halmos 1985, p. 208],
[Halmos 2000, p. 385-386] (emphasis added)
Some issues need to be clarified in connection with this passage:
(1) What is Halmos’ problem with formal logic exactly?
(2) What is wrong with the term interpretation?
(3) In what way does replacing the term interpretation by the term
homomorphism help?
(4) What is unsolid about formal logic?
Exploring these questions may help understand Halmos’ 36 year bat-
tle (1964–2000) against anything nonstandard.5 What Halmos seems
to be reacting against is a distinction taken for granted in modern
logic, namely that between syntax and semantics. Roughly, this means
that one can have a theory at the syntactic level which does not mean
anything until one interprets it in a specific model to get meaning (se-
mantics). This view presupposes a possibility of having distinct models
for the same theory.
5.3. Mathematics as one great thing. Halmos’ position against
such dualities appears to stem from a naive set-theoretic realism (al-
ready on display in his opposition to category theory; see Section 4).
Halmos seems opposed to the idea that there are distinct levels of things
in mathematics: you can have a theory of a distinct level of mathemat-
ical Sein than an interpretation thereof. Halmos apparently prefers to
see all mathematics as made of the same cloth:
5There is yet another dig against non-standard models in his 2000 article cited
above, one of the last ones he wrote.
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I see mathematics, the part of human knowledge that I
call mathematics, as one thing–one great, glorious thing.
(Halmos quoted in [Albers 1982, p. 234])
Now the ‘one great thing’ comment suggests that all mathematical
objects are sets, and sets differ in degree of complexity but they do not
differ in kind.
In this sense, homomorphisms are more solid than interpretations,
in that talking about homomorphisms implies that the domain and
the range are of the same kind, thereby escaping the duality of the-
ory/interpretation that seems to threaten the solidity of naive set-
theoretic realism. Perhaps Halmos’ polyadic algebras could be under-
stood as an attempt to undo formal logic with its threatening dualities
and inherent possibilities of unsolid (a.k.a., nonstandard) models. A
related point was made by G. Lolli, in the context of an analysis of
Halmos’ views, in the following terms:
. . . the deep reason for the opposition, depreciation and
misunderstandings concerning logic among mathemati-
cians lies in their inability or unwillingness to accept
the binomium language-metalanguage as a mathemat-
ical tool; they don’t even seem capable of understand-
ing its sense. This could be due to their habit of talk-
ing in an informal quasi-natural language, where meta-
language is flattened on the language itself, or the lan-
guages are absorbed in the metalanguage, a habit legit-
imated and reinforced by the set-theoretical framework.
[Lolli 2008]
Having identified the set-theoretic source of the problem, Lolli con-
cludes:
They should know however, as everybody is now aware,
that this very identification is the source of dangerous
circularities. Only the conceptual distinction, at least
in principle, of language and metalanguage avoids the
paradoxes. (ibid.)
6. A rhetorical analysis
In addition to scientific arguments, Halmos resorted on several occa-
sions to excesses of language aimed at marginalizing Robinson’s frame-
work, as we document in this section.
6.1. Halmos on types of worship. Halmos may have been a leading
expert in his field, but so was Edward Nelson (see e.g., [Nelson 1967]),
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and so is Peter Loeb (see e.g., [Loeb 1975]). Halmos had the following
to say about their relation to Abraham Robinson’s framework:
. . . for some converts (such as Pete Loeb and Ed Nelson),
it’s a religion, . . . For some others, who are against it
(for instance Errett Bishop), it’s an equally emotional
issue–they regard it as devil worship. [Halmos 1985,
p. 204] (emphasis added)
Halmos’ description of both Nelson and Loeb as “converts” in the
comment quoted above raises questions of motivation behind apply-
ing this kind of epithet to fellow leading mathematicians, or for that
matter of invoking Errett Bishop on “devil worship,” remarks that are
dangerously close to the category of expletives. In point of fact Bishop
never used such a term in reference to Robinson’s infinitesimals (see
more on devil worship in Section 6.2). Halmos sought to create the im-
pression of a balanced presentation of both sides of the controversy by
mentioning both Nelson and Bishop, but in fact both of his sides serve
only as a vehicle for an attempt to demonize Robinson’s framework.
6.2. Errett Bishop. Halmos’ remarks concerning devil worship in
Section 6.1 deserve closer scrutiny. Bishop’s verse on the neat devil
that is classical mathematics, from his essay “Schizophrenia in con-
temporary mathematics,” run as follows:
The devil is very neat. It is his pride
To keep his house in order. Every bit
Of trivia has its place. He takes great pains
To see that nothing ever does not fit.
And yet his guests are queasy. All their food,
Served with a flair and pleasant to the eye,
Goes through like sawdust. Pity the perfect host!
The devil thinks and thinks and he cannot cry.
(See [Bishop 1973, p. 14].) For additional details on Bishop’s antics see
[Katz & Katz 2011], [Katz & Katz 2012], [Kanovei et al. 2015]. The
“Schizophrenia” essay says not a word about Robinson’s framework,
and all the devil material (verse or prose) targets classical mathemat-
ics as a whole, including Halmos’ favorate subjects such as invariant
subspaces. Bishop’s poem was published earlier but composed later
than his teacher6 Halmos’ limerick; see Section 5.1. Halmos’ claim that
Bishop regarded Robinson’s framework as devil worship appears to be
merely a smear-by-proxy attack on Robinson. It is certainly possible
6Apparently in more than one area
ANALYSIS OF A CULTURAL ICON: THE CASE OF PAUL HALMOS 11
that Bishop may have made private remarks along these lines to Hal-
mos, who was after all his advisor. Still, Halmos’ purported quote of
Bishop cited in Section 6.1 is taken out of context.
We are not sure whether there is an official philosophical term for
such a rhetorical technique, but at any rate it is not the unique occur-
rence of such a technique in Halmos. He did something similar with
regard to category theory, while positioning himself safely behind the
broad backs of unnamed applied mathematicians; see Section 4.
6.3. Underworld. What would be the point of using mocking epi-
thets like “dredged up from the underworld,” as Halmos did in his
1990 article, in describing Robinson’s accomplishment with regard to
infinitesimals:
The modern theory of nonstandard analysis dredged the
forbidden concepts up from the underworld and is trying
to reinstate them at the right side of Cauchy’s throne.
[Halmos 1990, p. 569] (emphasis added)
Halmos may have been more moderate in his language than Connes who
used some objectionable vitriol in referring to Robinson’s framework
(see [Kanovei et al. 2013], [Katz & Leichtnam 2013]), but in the end
Halmos’ attitude is comparable to Connes’, that other leading expert.
In fact, in his book Halmos broadened his criticism of Robinson to a
broader criticism of logic:
The logician’s attention to the nuts and bolts of mathe-
matics, to the symbols and words (0 and + and “or” and
“and”), to their order (∀∃ or ∃∀), and to their grouping
(parentheses) can strike the mathematician as pettifog-
ging . . . [Halmos 1985, p. 205] [emphasis added]
The definite article attached to “mathematician” is the issue here, for
it presupposes that there is just one thing that counts as being a math-
ematician. ‘Some’ would make it more accurate, but significantly blunt
the force of the remark.
Here Halmos is apparently alluding to Robinson’s approach to in-
finitesimals via the theory of types, with its reliance on the “nuts and
bolts” of logic. If Halmos wished to publish an evaluation of Robin-
son’s framework, he could have been expected to have done enough
research to discover a more elementary analytical approach. This is
the ultrapower approach, already exploited in [Hewitt 1948] and pop-
ularized by Luxemburg in the CalTech Lecture Notes and e.g., in
[Luxemburg 1962], namely over two decades prior to the publication
of Halmos’ book.
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The sweeping and sarcastic critique Halmos presents fails to inform
the reader that there does exist an accessible analytical approach to
infinitesimals [Lindstrom 1988]. The existence of such an approach
makes much of Halmos’ vitriol rather misplaced. There might exist
more abstract approaches that he does not appreciate, but the same
can be said about many fields in mathematics. There are certainly
textbooks in, for example, differential geometry that are more acces-
sible than other textbooks in differential geometry. The existence of
the more abstract textbooks generally does not lead sceptical schol-
ars to speak of differential geometry as being “dredged up from the
underworld.”
7. Conclusion
Robinson’s characterisation of Bishop’s “attempt to describe the
philosophical and historical background of [the] remarkable endeavor”
of the constructive approach to mathematics, as “more vigorous than
accurate” [Robinson 1968, p. 921] applies equally well to Halmos’ take
on logical issues, conditioned by his naive set-theoretic realism. Such
a philosophical parti pris led Halmos to reject not merely Robinson’s
infinitesimals but also broad swaths of standard techniques and appli-
cations, ranging from a modern logical toolkit like first-order logic to
applied mathematics. Halmos’ attempted reform of logic is a radical
project that bears similarity to his student Errett Bishop’s even more
radical opposition to classical mathematics as a whole, as analyzed
elsewhere.
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